BEFORE THE
OIL AND GAS BOARD OF REVIEW
STATE OF OHIO
William I. Gorden
Joy Ttl. Gorden,
Appellants,
Appeal No.• 29

vs.
Andrew G. Skalkos, Chief
Division of Oil and Gas
Appellee.

ORDER GRANTING APPELLEE'S
MOTION TO DISMISS
On March 27, 1981 counsel for the Appellee, Mr. Skalkos, filed
a Motion to Dismiss with this Board to dismiss the Appeal filed in
this matter for the reason that it was moot.

Appellee's claim of

mootness is based on the fact that on January 12, 1981 the Appellee
rescinded Order No. 276, by issuing Order No. 278.
No memorandum opposing Appellee's Motion to Dismiss has been
filed with the Board.
THEREFORE, the Board finds the Appellee~s Motion To Dismiss to
be \'lell taken and Orders to Appeal No •. 29. be dismissed.
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BEFORE THE
OIL AND GAS BOARD OF REVIEW
STATE OF OHIO
WILLIAM I. GORDON,
Appellant,
Appeal No. 29

v.

ANDREW G. SKALKOS,
Appellee.
MOTION TO DISMISS
Apepllee moves that the Board dismiss this appeal for the
reason that it is moot.
MEMORANDUM
On November 17, 1980, the Chief of the Division of Oil and
Gas issued adjudication order No. 276 to Darrell L. Siebert.
Within thirty days thereafter, William I. Gordon filed an appeal
with this Board contesting the adjudication order.

On January 12,

1981, the Chief issued adjudication order no. 278, which rescinded
adjudication order No. 276.

No appeal has been filed with the

Board with respect to order No. 278 by Mr. Gordon or anyone else.
As a consequence, order No. 276 no longer has legal import or
effect and the adjudication proceeding regarding it presents only
moot questions.
The leading case in Ohio on the subject of mootness is
Miner v. Witt, 82 Ohio St. 237 (19l0).

There, the plaintiff filed

an action to enjoin the annexation of a portion of. the territory

of an adjoining village of the City of Cleveland.

The court

of common pleas denied relief and the circuit,court affirmed.
Shortly after an appeal was filed with the Supreme Court,
annexation proceedings were completed and the entire village
became a part of the city.

Despite the admitted importance of

the legal question involved in the case, the Court declined to
express its opinion thereon since a decision could not be
made effectual by a judgment.

Quoting the United States

Supreme Court, the Court held, at 238-239:
The duty of this court, as of every
other judicial tribunal, is to decide
actual controversies by a judgment
which can be carried into effect, and
not to give opinions upon moot questions
or abstract propositions, or to declare
principles or rules of law which cannot
affect the matter in issue in the case
before it. It necessarily follows that
whe~ pending an appeal from the judgment
of a lower court, and without any fault
of the defendant, an event occurs which
renders it impossible for this court,
if it should decide the case in favor
of the plaintiff, to grant him any
effectual relief whatever, the court
will not proceed to a formal judgment,
but will dismiss the appeal. And such
a fact, when not appearing on the record,
may be proved by extrinsic evidence.
Many of the cases before the Supreme Court that have
presented moot questions have involved the Public Utilities
Commission:

Commercial Motor Freight v. Public Utilities Com-

mission of Ohio, 161 Ohio St. 58 (1954); Travis v. Public Utilit
Commission of Ohio, 123 Ohio St. 356 (1931); Scheible v. Hogan,
113 Ohio St. 83 (1925).

In Commercial Motor Freight, supra,

the Court dismissed as moot an appeal by a common carrier
of the granting of a certificate of public

co~venience

and

necessity to a rival common carrier, Duff Truck Line, Inc., for
the reason that while the appeal was pending before the Court,
the Public Utilities Commission vacated the certificate pursuant
to the withdrawal of the application therefor by Duff.
In Travis, supra, the Court refused to rule on the lawfulness
of an order of the Public Utilities Commission allowing a carrier
to abandon certain railway lines wheretbe objecting parties
neither sought nor obtained a stay of the Commission's order
pending appeal and the property had been so far dismantled as
to preclude the re-establishment and resumption of service.

The

Franklin County Court of Appeals has followed the principle
set down in Travis on at least two occasions.

In O'Neill v.

Henney, 76 Ohio L.Abs. 358 (Franklin Co., 1957), and Wagner v.
Boggess Coal and Supply Co., 57 Ohio L.Abs. 270 (Franklin Co.,
1950), the Court dismissed appeals on grounds of mootness where
the conduct sought to be prevented had been completed prior to
the time that the Court could

~ule

on the legal questions presented.

See also Levin v. Pribanic, 110 Ohio App. 381 (Lorain Co., 1959).
Scheible v. Hogan, supra, involved an appeal of an injunction
which restrained city officials from interfering with a certificate of public convenience and necessity that had been issued to
a motor transportation company.

Two days after the motion to

certify was allowed, the Public Utilities Commission modified

the certificate in a manner that made it palatable to the city.
Citing Miner v. Witt, supra, the Court held in syllabus 4:
Where a judgment has been entered by
a court of competent jurisdiction in
favor of a motor transportation company,
based upon the operative provisions of
a certiciate of convenience and necessity
issued by the Public utilities Commission,
and thereafter and during the pendency
of error proceedings such certificate is
altered or amended by the Commission in
such manner as to nullify those provisions
upon which the judgment is founded, a
reviewing court is not authorized to
further proceed.
The principle that emerges from a review of these cases,
particularly Commercial Motor Freight and Scheible v. Hogan,
is that the discontinuation, completion arrevocation of an
allegedly unlawful order or action will cause an appellate court
to decline jurisdiction.
The rescission

of~

claimed was unlawful has

order mo.

27~which

the Appellant

_,obviated all objections that could

have been lodged against it.

The offending action

has ceased

to exist as a matter of law.

There is nothing upon which the

Board can conduct a hearing.

There is no judgment which the

Board could issue that could affect a nonexistent order.
Therefore, this Board should dismiss this appeal because the
matter presented is moot.
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM J. BROWN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OHIO

Assistant Attorney General
Environmental Law Section
30 East Broad Street, 17th Floor
Columbus, Ohio 43215
(614) 466-2766

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Motion to
Dismiss has been sent by regular u.S. Mail to Darrell L. Seibert,
3724 Country Club Drive, Suite 300, New Philadelphia, Ohio 44224,
and to William T. Gordon, 4468 Fishcreek Road, Stow, Ohio 44224,
on this

;;.6 tf-

day of March, 1981.
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